STATEMENT OF
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UNITED STATES SENATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND COMBATING TERRORISM

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Introduction
Good day, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to review for you the initiatives that the Department of Defense has taken to combat terrorism.

The tragic bombings of our embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, serve as a stark reminder that terrorists of the world can strike any time, in any country, and certainly where we might otherwise assess the threat as low. Our adversaries, unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily, spend millions of dollars each year on terrorist organizations that target U.S. citizens, property, and interests. Consequently, our Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs remain committed to ensuring that our service men and women receive the best possible protection. Sustained vigilance is the key. We must avoid the “sine wave” effect, maintain a high level of awareness, and remain ever watchful.

Within the military, we divide our Combating Terrorism Program into three components: Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, and Terrorism Consequence Management. Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures to deter, resolve, and mitigate a terrorist act. Consequence management refers to measures used
to minimize loss of life and property damage following a terrorist incident.

**Antiterrorism Force Protection**

Since the Khobar Tower bombing in June 1996, we have instituted a variety of programs to reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. I’ll highlight a few of the most significant of these initiatives.

We have organized five Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA) Teams to assess our Antiterrorism Force Protection readiness. These teams visit designated military installations worldwide, both CONUS and OCONUS, to assess intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities, physical security measures, infrastructure support and vulnerabilities, and the installation’s ability to respond to a terrorist incident. Although the terrorist can instill terror in a variety of methods including kidnapping and assassination, today, the terrorist weapon of choice remains the vehicle bomb. As a result, the JSIVA Teams emphasize the importance of sound perimeter security, thorough access procedures for deterrence, adequate building standoff distance, and comprehensive response plans for incident damage mitigation. We’ve completed 164 assessments since the program’s inception in 1997 and will complete an additional 76 by the end of this calendar year.
To enhance Antiterrorism Force Protection readiness, we have also developed an installation template, complete with a Weapons of Mass Destruction Appendix, that provides the Installation Commander a step-by-step guide to develop a thorough and inclusive Antiterrorism Force Protection Plan.

We have placed considerable emphasis on Antiterrorism Force Protection Training. Specifically, we have instituted:

- A basic level training curriculum for our personnel and their families;
- An advanced level curriculum for our Antiterrorism Force Protection Officers;
- Antiterrorism Force Protection education into Commanding Officer “command pipeline” training;
- And an executive-level seminar for our senior officers.

As you are aware, our State Department Chiefs of Mission are responsible for the Antiterrorism force protection of DoD personnel and their families stationed in their respective countries (unless those individuals are “assigned” to the area geographic Commander in Chief (CINC)). However, we also recognize that there are situations where the CINC is best capable to provide protection for “non-CINC assigned” personnel and, conversely, situations where the Chief of Mission is better equipped to provide protection for “CINC-assigned” personnel. As a result, in 1997, Secretaries Cohen and Albright signed the
“Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on Security of DOD Elements and Personnel in Foreign Areas.” This document allows the Chief of Mission and CINC to determine the best force protection provider and negotiate Antiterrorism Force Protection responsibilities accordingly. To date, the Chiefs of Mission and CINCs have signed seventeen country-specific agreements and we anticipate signing eighty additional agreements this year.

We have made significant advances in identifying available technologies that have AT/FP application, and have in place two organizations that proved vital to providing us critical technology. The Physical Security Equipment Action Group coordinates DoD efforts in acquiring all physical security equipment, including Commercial-Off-The-Shelf technology that has ATFP applicability. Another organization, the Technical Support Working Group, focuses on rapid prototype technologies. Of note, the Technical Support Working Group provides support to most U.S. government agencies.

We also provide considerable resource support to the CINCs and Services. The Joint Staff operates a Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund to resource those critical AT/FP requirements that can not wait for the normal Service Program Objective Memorandum process. Our combined FY 97-98 obligation totaled $59 million. The FY 99 and FY 00 CbT RIF account
contains $15 million for each year. Additionally, we oversee Service Program Objective Memorandum submissions and CINC Integrated Priority Lists to ensure adequate emphasis on Antiterrorism Force Protection programs.

Despite our accomplishments, we are convinced we can do more. We recently commissioned a six-month “Best Practices Study” to study, compare, and assess the AT/FP practices of Israel and the United Kingdom, two countries that have lived with the terrorist threat for many years on a continuous basis. This study will better assist us to determine the direction our AT/FP program should take into the future.

**Counterterrorism**

I now would like to talk for a few minutes about our Counterterrorism program.

Within the United States Government, our Armed Forces possess a unique capability to respond with a tailored range of options to counter terrorism directed at US citizens, interests, and property, both domestically and overseas. Many assets in our Armed Forces can be applied to Counterterrorism, not just Special Operations Forces. We can employ elements of the full range of our military power, e.g. strategic lift platforms to transport attack platforms to the vicinity of a target area and then, for instance, conduct a synchronized strike in conjunction with ship or aircraft launched cruise missiles or other assets...
from our “conventional” inventory. And of course, DOD has rapid-response Special Operations Forces units which are specifically trained, manned, and equipped to pre-empt or resolve incidents of international terrorism. This includes a number of rapid response elements for responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorist events.

U.S. Armed Forces may also be utilized in tactical response to terrorist incidents within the United States under certain emergency conditions defined by statute when authorized by the President. Such authorization would be based upon a determination that resolution of a terrorist incident exceeds the technical or tactical capability of domestic law enforcement agencies, or the nature and scope of an incident calls for a response by military forces. The utilization of DoD forces in incidents of terrorism within the United States serves to ensure our nation has the full range of options available to manage incidents of terrorism.

We have several well-developed capabilities that have been intensely exercised with our interagency partners, and used on several occasions to assist our FBI counterparts. These capabilities include a 24-hour command center to respond to terrorist incidents; specialized military units on alert to respond within hours; and a command and control element knowledgeable of all terrorist scenarios. These forces have been
augmented with integral technical expertise, and can rapidly access our national laboratory expertise to assist them in rendering safe a WMD.

In recognition of the significant dangers associated with WMD, in May 1995 the Secretary of Defense assigned Special Operations Forces some specific responsibilities in support of the broader interagency task of preventing the proliferation of WMD.

Today, Counterproliferation (CP) has been given top operational priority at USSOCOM. Counterproliferation includes actions taken to locate, identify, seize, destroy, render safe, or transport WMD. USSOCOM is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces to disable or destroy NBC weapons and their means of delivery, taking into account the need to mitigate collateral effects. We are pursuing several approaches to address the WMD threat, including working with the geographic CINCs to determine how best to bring SOF’s capabilities to bear in support of theater CP objectives. We continue to pursue an aggressive strategy and refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to allow engagement of the full range of WMD targets. These targets include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; improvised devices; means of delivery; and supporting infrastructure.
Terrorist Consequence Management

I now would like to review what we are doing in the area of Terrorist Consequence Management. Although Consequence Management (CM) is considered a new and vitally important military mission, DOD has been looking at how we might mitigate the effects of a WMD incident well before it became a subject of public discussion following the demise of the Soviet Union and the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo. The military is working hard to deter and, when necessary, minimize the effects of a WMD terrorist incident. We have created, and are continually refining, an excellent response capability.

Presidential Decision Directives-39, 56, and 62 task DOD to prepare to manage the consequences of a WMD attack. As a result, the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands have initiated a robust exercise program to ensure that we are postured to respond. Since 1996, each Combatant Command has conducted a CJCS exercise featuring a terrorism and WMD scenario that required Consequence Management planning.

We have written and published two documents that articulate requirements and provide our response concept. Both Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Concept Plans (CONPLANs) 0300 and 0400 address WMD and provide guidance to the Combatant Commanders on Consequence Management.
Overseas, each geographic Combatant Commander leads the military response. As directed in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3214.01 (Military Support to Foreign Consequence Management Operations), the CINCs will respond in three stages. In Stage 1 (Initial DOD Response), the CINC deploys his own initial assessment element to report and establish communications. In Stage 2 (Subsequent DOD Response), the CINC deploys forces in vicinity of the incident. These assets fall under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the CINC's assessment headquarters already deployed. Finally, in Stage 3 (Follow-on Assistance), CINCUSACOM deploys CONUS-based forces with specialized knowledge in CM operations.

As recently as last month, CJCS directed all Combatant Commanders to review the status of their Consequence Management (CM) planning and provide him an update. This review will assist us in refining our overseas response concept.

I also would like to discuss several programs resulting from of our military's evolving civil support mission. As you know, DoD is not the lead agency for civil defense. However, we provide key support to both the Federal Bureau of Investigation for terrorist incidents and to the Federal Emergency Management Agency for disaster relief assistance including those resulting from terrorist acts. The Department of the Army Director of Military
Support (DOMS) is charged with developing DoD’s program in support of our Domestic Preparedness Program.

As part of the recent Unified Command Plan (UCP) initiatives, DOD has given guidance to proceed with “a flexible and evolutionary path” toward establishment of USACOM as a functional Joint Forces Command including a dedicated Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JTF-CS). It is envisioned that the JTF-CS will be a command and control element with forces provided by ACOM, the force provider. CINCUSACOM is presently working on a Concept Plan for implementation by October of this year.

Our U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) is a standing, highly trained consequence management unit able to respond on short notice to terrorist initiated chemical or biological incidents. Assigned to ACOM, CBIRF provides an expert and robust decontamination capability that can also augment other response capabilities.

We also foresee our National Guard and other Reserve Component personnel continuing to play a prominent role in supporting local and state governments in terrorism consequence management. We have established 10 Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams, comprised of full-time, well-trained and well-equipped National Guard personnel. One RAID team will be stationed within each of 10 federal regions. Their purpose will
be to deploy rapidly, assist local first responders in determining the nature of an attack, provide expert medical and technical advice, and assist with the identification and arrival of follow-on state and federal military response assets.

To ensure the continued integration of the National Guard and Reserve into our national WMD preparedness strategy, the Reserve Component Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO) has been established within the Army Staff. It reports directly to the Director of Military Support.

Conclusion

I want to conclude by saying that we believe that we have made substantial progress in combating terrorism and our people are much better protected today than in the past. We have implemented new physical protection measures, new standards, new policies, new doctrine, and new capabilities. Nevertheless, it is only a matter of time before terrorists successfully attack our forces. This presents two continuing challenges—maintaining the focus and confronting the threat.

As time passes following a terrorist incident, the risk of complacency increases. This is the opening terrorists hope to find and will remain our most difficult challenge. At the same time DoD must maintain the proper balance between complacency and alarm. After many months at a high THREATCON, our deployed
forces become increasingly skeptical of repeated warnings if impending attacks fail to materialize.

Our second challenge will be to anticipate new trends, targets, and tactics and adapt to the terrorist threat as it evolves. Terrorists will continue to probe U.S. defenses to identify and exploit our vulnerabilities. The question concerning terrorist attack is not “if” but “when.” Our challenge is to anticipate the threat and take appropriate countermeasures. Despite our many significant achievements, we must continue to devote whatever resources are required to protect our people, our installations, and our national interests.

Thank you.